SummaryThis paper explores the interactions between scientific travel, politics, instrument making and the epistemology of scientific instruments in Napoleon's Europe. In the early 1800s, the German astronomer Franz Xaver von Zach toured Italy and Southern France with instruments made by G. Reichenbach in his newly-established Bavarian workshop. I argue that von Zach acted as a broker for German technology and science and that travel, personal contacts and direct demonstrations were crucial in establishing Reichenbach's reputation and in conquering new markets. The (...) rise of German instrument making highlights the complexity of the scientific relationship between the centre and the peripheries in Napoleon's empire, and reveals the existence of diverging views on the role of instruments and of their makers. In von Zach's view, Reichenbach's instruments could not penetrate the French market because Parisian astronomers focused on mathematical astronomy and, for both political and epistemological reasons, dismissed instruments and material innovations from the peripheries. The German astronomer and his Italian colleagues, on the contrary, regarded Reichenbach's technical achievements as outstanding contributions to astronomy, and considered the political and cultural hegemony of the capital as a hindrance to the advancement of science. (shrink)

This paper explores the interactions between scientific travel, politics, instrument making and the epistemology of scientific instruments in Napoleon's Europe. In the early 1800s, the German astronomer Franz Xaver von Zach toured Italy and Southern France with instruments made by G. Reichenbach in his newly-established Bavarian workshop. I argue that von Zach acted as a broker for German technology and science and that travel, personal contacts and direct demonstrations were crucial in establishing Reichenbach's reputation and in conquering new markets. The (...) rise of German instrument making highlights the complexity of the scientific relationship between the centre and the peripheries in Napoleon's empire, and reveals the existence of diverging views on the role of instruments and of their makers. In von Zach's view, Reichenbach's instruments could not penetrate the French market because Parisian astronomers focused on mathematical astronomy and, for both political and epistemological reasons, dismissed instruments and material innovations from the peripheries. The German astronomer and his Italian colleagues, on the contrary, regarded Reichenbach's technical achievements as outstanding contributions to astronomy, and considered the political and cultural hegemony of the capital as a hindrance to the advancement of science. (shrink)

Si les analyses merleau-pontiennes sont aujourd’hui fréquemment utilisées dans les études postcoloniales, notamment les analyses du corps, on n’a toujours pas prêté suffisamment attention à l’importance qu’eut pour sa pensée la confrontation avec la réalité du colonialisme, au fil de divers voyages vers la moitié des années 1950. Dans l’article, il s’agit en particulier de faire émerger le rôle exemplaire qu’au pu avoir la confrontation avec la réalité de Madagascar, en 1957, et ses effets en retour sur un certain nombre (...) de catégories philosophiques et politiques. Outre la reconstruction historique des circonstances de ce voyage, l’article se focalise sur trois notions centrales dont cette « épreuve de l’étranger » aura permis de faire apparaître la nature dialectique : les notions d’altérité, d’universalité, et d’autodétermination. L’altérité n’est plus une relation frontale, mais résulte d’une expérience de « décentrement » ; l’universalité doit être problématisée, en direction d’un « universel latéral » tandis que l’idée même de l’autodétermination soulève des questionnements autant politiques qu’ontologiques : dans la lutte pour une indépendance immédiate des colonies, Merleau-Ponty soupçonne le spectre d’une pensée libérale qui masque les liens de dépendance qui persistent sous d’autres formes. If Merleau-Pontian analyses – notably the analyses of the body – are, today, frequently used in post-colonial studies, sufficient attention was not always paid to the importance that the confrontation with the reality of colonialism had for his thought in the course of various travels during the mid-1950’s. This article is concerned, in particular, with shedding light on the exemplary role that the confrontation with the reality of Madagascar in 1957 could have had, and its effects in return on quite a number of philosophical and political categories. More than a historical reconstruction of the circumstances of that journey, the article focuses on three central notions whose dialectical nature is made apparent by this “experience of the foreign”: the notions of alterity, universality, and self-determination. Alterity is no longer a frontal relation, but results from an experience of “decentering,” universality must be problematized in the direction of a “lateral universality,” and the very idea of self-determination raises questions as much political as ontological. In the struggle for an immediate independence for the colonies, Merleau-Ponty senses the specter of a liberal thought that conceals the relations of dependence that persist in other forms. Se oggi le riflessioni merleau-pontiane, in particolare sul corpo, sono utilizzate di frequente negli studi postcoloniali, non si è mai prestata sufficiente attenzione all’importanza che ebbe, per il pensiero di Merleau-Ponty, il confronto con la realtà del colonialismo nel corso dei diversi viaggi effettuati dal filosofo verso la metà degli anni ’50. In quest’articolo ci proponiamo di far emergere il ruolo esemplare che poté avere il confronto con la realtà del Madagascar nel 1957 e le sue ripercussioni su un certo numero di categorie filosofiche e politiche. Oltre che sulla ricostruzione storica delle circostanze di questo viaggio, l’articolo si concentra su tre nozioni di cui questa esperienza avrebbe permesso di far apparire la natura dialettica: le nozioni di alterità, di universalità e di autodeterminazione. L’alterità non è più una relazione frontale, bensì risulta da un’esperienza di “decentramento”; l’universalità deve essere problematizzata nella direzione di un “universale laterale”, mentre l’idea stessa di autodeterminazione solleva un interrogarsi tanto politico che ontologico: nella lotta per un’indipendenza immediata delle colonie, Merleau-Ponty intravvede infatti lo spettro di un pensiero liberale volto a mascherare i legami di dipendenza per farli così persistere sotto altre forme. (shrink)

Today, two forces combine to produce a systematic transformation in all that is given. First, the economic force of the global market is propelled by a series of techno-scientific advances that continually reinvent that market. Second, the political force of modern democracies, in spite of their different actualizations, centers individual autonomy as the ultimate norm that would create each individual’s future. The human body, in virtue of its intrinsic plasticity and because it is always the body of a particular individual, (...) lends itself to this process of unlimited transformation in a privileged way. As such, the human body is the promise of enhancement without end. The following questions thus arise: Does the human body possess normative aspects that would bound or enclose its future transformations when considered from the modern frame of the autonomous individual? Could Merleau-Ponty’s notion of le corps propre point us in the direction of an answer? Is there a bodily given that authorizes self-experience, apart from any external or theological frame? Or, is the bodily given only a myth that obscures the human body’s actual capacity for unlimited transformation?Aujourd’hui, deux forces se combinent pour produire une transformation systématique sur tout ce qui est donné. Premièrement, la force économique du marché mondial est mue par une série de progrès techno-scientifiques qui le réinvente continuellement. Deuxièmement, la force politique des démocraties modernes, en dépit de leurs différentes actualisations, centre l’autonomie individuelle en tant que norme ultime qui pourrait créer le futur de chaque individu. Le corps humain, en vertu de sa plasticité intrinsèque et parce qu’il est toujours le corps d’un individu particulier, se prête lui-même à ce processus de transformation illimitée d’une manière privilégiée. Ainsi, le corps humain est la promesse d’une amélioration sans fin. Émergent alors les questions suivantes : le corps humain possède-t-il des aspects normatifs qui lieraient ou enfermeraient ses transformations futures lorsqu’il est considéré à partir du cadre moderne de l’autonomie individuelle? La notion merleau-pontienne de corps propre peut-elle nous donner une réponse? Y a-t-il un corporellement donné qui autorise une expérience de soi, en dehors de tout cadre extérieur ou théologique? Ou bien, le corporellement donné n’est-il qu’un mythe qui obscurcit la capacité actuelle de transformation illimitée du corps humain?Oggi, due forze contribuiscono a produrre una trasformazione sistematica di tutto ciò che è dato. In primo luogo, la forza economica del mercato globale, alimentata da una serie di progressi tecnologici che continuano a reinventare il mercato. In secondo luogo, la forza politica delle moderne democrazie, che, nonostante le loro differenti attualizzazioni, indicano l’autonomia individuale come norma ultima, in grado di garantire il futuro del singolo. Il corpo umano, in virtù della sua plasticità intrinseca e dal momento in cui esso è sempre il corpo di uno specifico individuo, si presta in modo privilegiato a questo processo di continua trasformazione. In quanto tale, il corpo umano è la promessa di un potenziamento illimitato. Il chè suscita le seguenti domande: vi sono degli aspetti normativi che verrebbero a limitare o vincolare le future trasformazioni del corpo umano, considerato nella prospettiva moderna dell’individuo autonomo? La nozione di corpo proprio elaborata da Merleau-Ponty può metterci sulle tracce di una risposta? Esiste un “corpo dato” che autorizzi un’esperienza di sé, a prescindere da ogni orizzonte esterno o teleologico? Oppure il “corpo dato” è puramente un mito che verrebbe a oscurare le illimitate capacità di trasformazione del corpo umano? (shrink)

Information exchange can be seen as a dynamic process of raising and resolving issues. The goal of this paper is to provide a logical framework to model and reason about this process. We develop an inquisitive dynamic epistemic logic , which enriches the standard framework of dynamic epistemic logic , incorporating insights from recent work on inquisitive semantics. At a static level, IDEL does not only allow us to model the information available to a set of agents, like standard epistemic (...) logic, but also the issues that the agents entertain. At a dynamic level, IDEL does not only allow us to model the effects of communicative actions that provide new information, like standard DEL, but also the effects of actions that raise new issues. Thus, IDEL provides the fundamental tools needed to analyze information exchange as a dynamic process of raising and resolving issues. (shrink)

This paper argues that questions have an important role to to play in logic, both semantically and proof-theoretically. Semantically, we show that by generalizing the classical notion of entailment to questions, we can capture not only the standard relation of logical consequence, which holds between pieces of information, but also the relation of logical dependency, which holds between information types. Proof-theoretically, we show that questions may be used in inferences as placeholders for arbitrary information of a given type; by manipulating (...) such placeholders, we may construct formal proofs of dependencies. Finally, we show that such proofs have a specific kind of constructive content: they do not just witness the existence of a certain dependency, but actually encode a method for transforming information of the types described by the assumptions into information of the type described by the conclusion. (shrink)

There is a prominent line of work in natural language semantics, rooted in the work of Hamblin, in which the meaning of a sentence is not taken to be a single proposition, but rather a set of propositions—a set of alternatives. This allows for a more fine-grained view on meaning, which has led to improved analyses of a wide range of linguistic phenomena. However, this approach also faces a number of problems. We focus here on two of these, in our (...) view the most fundamental ones. The first has to do with how meanings are composed, i.e., with the type-theoretic operations of function application and abstraction; the second has to do with how meanings are compared, i.e., the notion of entailment. Our aim is to reconcile what we take to be the essence of Hamblin’s proposal with the more orthodox type-theoretic framework rooted in the work of Montague in such a way that both the explanatory utility of the former and the solid formal foundations of the latter are preserved. Our proposal builds on insights from recent work on inquisitive semantics, and it also contributes to the further development of this framework by specifying how the inquisitive meaning of a sentence may be built up compositionally. (shrink)

The book presents a new logical framework to capture the meaning of sentences in conversation. It is based on a richer notion of meaning than traditional approaches, and allows for an integrated treatment of statements and questions. The first part of the book presents the framework in detail, while the second demonstrates its many benefits.

This paper investigates a generalized version of inquisitive semantics. A complete axiomatization of the associated logic is established, the connection with intuitionistic logic and several intermediate logics is explored, and the generalized version of inquisitive semantics is argued to have certain advantages over the system that was originally proposed by Groenendijk (2009) and Mascarenhas (2009).

The problem of probabilities of conditionals is one of the long-standing puzzles in philosophy of language. We defend and update Adams' solution to the puzzle: the probability of an epistemic conditional is not the probability of a proposition, but a probability under a supposition. -/- Close inspection of how a triviality result unfolds in a concrete scenario does not provide counterexamples to the view that probabilities of conditionals are conditional probabilities: instead, it supports the conclusion that probabilities of conditionals violate (...) standard probability theory. -/- This does not call into question probability theory per se; rather, it calls for a more careful understanding of its role: probability theory is a theory of probabilities of propositions; but as conditionals do not express propositions, their probabilities are not subject to the standard laws. -/- We argue that both conditional probabilities and probabilities of conditionals are best understood in terms of the dynamics of supposing, modeled as a restriction operation on a probability space. This version of the suppositionalist view allows us to connect Adams' Thesis to the widely held restrictor view of the semantics of conditionals. -/- We address two common objections to Adams' view: that the relevant probabilities are ‘probabilities only in name’, and that giving up conditional propositions puts us at a disadvantage when it comes to interpreting compounds. -/- Finally, we argue that some putative counterexamples to Adams' Thesis can be diagnosed as fallacies of probabilistic reasoning: they arise from applying to conditionals laws of standard probability theory which are invalid for them. (shrink)

In many natural languages, there are clear syntactic and/or intonational differences between declarative sentences, which are primarily used to provide information, and interrogative sentences, which are primarily used to request information. Most logical frameworks restrict their attention to the former. Those that are concerned with both usually assume a logical language that makes a clear syntactic distinction between declaratives and interrogatives, and usually assign different types of semantic values to these two types of sentences. A different approach has been taken (...) in recent work on inquisitive semantics. This approach does not take the basic syntactic distinction between declaratives and interrogatives as its starting point, but rather a new notion of meaning that captures both informative and inquisitive content in an integrated way. The standard way to treat the logical connectives in this approach is to associate them with the basic algebraic operations on these new types of meanings. For instance, conjunction and disjunction are treated as meet and join operators, just as in classical logic. This gives rise to a hybrid system, where sentences can be both informative and inquisitive at the same time, and there is no clearcut division between declaratives and interrogatives. It may seem that these two general approaches in the existing literature are quite incompatible. The main aim of this paper is to show that this is not the case. We develop an inquisitive semantics for a logical language that has a clearcut division between declaratives and interrogatives. We show that this language coincides in expressive power with the hybrid language that is standardly assumed in inquisitive semantics, we establish a sound and complete axiomatization for the associated logic, and we consider a natural enrichment of the system with presuppositional interrogatives. (shrink)

Based on a crowdsourced truth value judgment experiment, we provide empirical evidence challenging two classical views in semantics, and we develop a novel account of counterfactuals that combines ideas from inquisitive semantics and causal reasoning. First, we show that two truth-conditionally equivalent clauses can make different semantic contributions when embedded in a counterfactual antecedent. Assuming compositionality, this means that the meaning of these clauses is not fully determined by their truth conditions. This finding has a clear explanation in inquisitive semantics: (...) truth-conditionally equivalent clauses may be associated with different propositional alternatives, each of which counts as a separate counterfactual assumption. Second, we show that our results contradict the common idea that the interpretation of a counterfactual involves minimizing change with respect to the actual state of affairs. We propose to replace the idea of minimal change by a distinction between foreground and background for a given counterfactual assumption: the background is held fixed in the counterfactual situation, while the foreground can be varied without any minimality constraint. (shrink)

It is common practice in formal semantics to assume that the context specifies an assignment of values to variables and that the same variables that receive contextually salient values when they occur free may also be bound by quantifiers and λs. These assumptions are at work to provide a unified account of free and bound uses of third person pronouns, namely one by which the same lexical item is involved in both uses. One way to pursue this account is to (...) treat quantifiers and λs as monsters in Kaplan’s sense. We argue that this move should be avoided and explore an alternative route based on the idea that there is a variable assignment coordinate in the context and a variable assignment coordinate in the circumstance of evaluation, with the definition of truth in context identifying them. One fundamental challenge that arises in pursuing a unified account is to explain the difference in the way the gender presuppositions of bound and free pronouns project. The proposal that emerges from the attempt to meet this challenge is a non-indexical account of free third person pronouns and a new conception of the role and structure of assignment functions. (shrink)

We present a gravitational quantum dynamics theory that combines quantum field theory for particle dynamics in space-time with classical Einstein’s general relativity in a non-Riemannian Finsler space. This approach is based on the geometrization of quantum mechanics proposed in Tavernelli and combines quantum and gravitational effects into a global curvature of the Finsler space induced by the quantum potential associated to the matter quantum fields. In order to make this theory compatible with general relativity, the quantum effects are described in (...) the framework of quantum field theory, where a covariant definition of ‘simultaneity’ for many-body systems is introduced through the definition of a suited foliation of space-time. As in Einstein’s gravitation theory, the particle dynamics is finally described by means of a geodesic equation in a curved space-time manifold. (shrink)

Inquisitive modal logic, InqML, is a generalisation of standard Kripke-style modal logic. In its epistemic incarnation, it extends standard epistemic logic to capture not just the information that agents have, but also the questions that they are interested in. Technically, InqML fits within the family of logics based on team semantics. From a model-theoretic perspective, it takes us a step in the direction of monadic second-order logic, as inquisitive modal operators involve quantification over sets of worlds. We introduce and investigate (...) the natural notion of bisimulation equivalence in the setting of InqML. We compare the expressiveness of InqML and first-order logic in the context of relational structures with two sorts, one for worlds and one for information states, and characterise inquisitive modal logic as the bisimulation invariant fragment of first-order logic over various natural classes of two-sorted structures. (shrink)

A construction is found in American Sign Language that we call a Question–Answer Clause. It is made of two parts: the first part looks like an interrogative clause conveying a question, while the second part resembles a declarative clause answering that question. The very same signer has to sign both, the entire construction is interpreted as truth-conditionally equivalent to a declarative sentence, and it can be uttered only under certain discourse conditions. These and other properties of Question–Answer Clauses are discussed, (...) and a detailed syntactic, semantic, and pragmatic account is provided. Question–Answer Clauses are argued to be copular clauses consisting of a silent copula of identity connecting an interrogative clause in the precopular position with a declarative clause in the postcopular position. Pragmatically, they instantiate a topic/comment structure, with the first part expressing a sub-question under discussion and the second part expressing the answer to that sub-question. Broader implications of the analysis are discussed for the Question Under Discussion theory of discourse structuring, for the analysis of pseudoclefts in spoken languages, and for recent proposals about the need for answerhood operators and exhaustivity operators in the grammar and the consequences for the syntax/semantics/pragmatics interface. (shrink)

I propose an account of indicative conditionals that combines features of minimal change semantics and information semantics. As in information semantics, conditionals are interpreted relative to an information state in accordance with the Ramsey test idea: “if p then q” is supported at a state s iff q is supported at the hypothetical state s[p] obtained by restricting s to the p-worlds. However, information states are not modeled as simple sets of worlds, but by means of a Lewisian system of (...) spheres. Worlds in the inner sphere are considered possible; worlds outside of it are ruled out, but to different degrees. In this way, even when a state supports “not p”, it is still possible to suppose p consistently. I argue that this account does better than its predecessors with respect to a set of desiderata concerning inferences with conditionals. In particular, it captures three important facts: that a conditional is logically independent from its antecedent; that a sequence of antecedents behaves like a single conjunctive antecedent ; and that conditionals restrict the quantification domain of epistemic modals. I also discuss two ways to construe the role of a premise, and propose a generalized notion of entailment that keeps the two apart. (shrink)

This paper intends to present briefly Aristotle’s direct tradition as found in the papyri already published, first in those containing Aristotle’s preserved works, then in those tentatively attributed to his lost works. Some papyrological and philological contributions are offered regarding the text of the first group, in particular by collation of the most recent editions and consideration of the latest studies. As for the second group, the arguments pro and contra Aristotelian authorship are analysed.

In recent years, the logic of questions and dependencies has been investigated in the closely related frameworks of inquisitive logic and dependence logic. These investigations have assumed classical logic as the background logic of statements, and added formulas expressing questions and dependencies to this classical core. In this paper, we broaden the scope of these investigations by studying questions and dependency in the context of intuitionistic logic. We propose an intuitionistic team semantics, where teams are embedded within intuitionistic Kripke models. (...) The associated logic is a conservative extension of intuitionistic logic with questions and dependence formulas. We establish a number of results about this logic, including a normal form result, a completeness result, and translations to classical inquisitive logic and modal dependence logic. (shrink)

The view that if-clauses function semantically as restrictors is widely regarded as the only candidate for a fully general account of conditionals. The standard implementation of this view assumes that, where no operator to be restricted is in sight, if-clauses restrict covert epistemic modals. Stipulating such modals, however, lacks independent motivation and leads to wrong empirical predictions. In this paper I provide a theory of conditionals on which if-clauses are uniformly interpreted as restrictors, but no covert modals are postulated. Epistemic (...) if-clauses, like those in bare conditionals, restrict an information state parameter which is used to interpret an expressive layer of the language. I show that this theory yields an attractive account of bare and overtly modalized conditionals and solves various empirical problems for the standard view, while dispensing with its less plausible assumption. (shrink)

Building on recent work by Yale Weiss, we study conditional logics in the intuitionistic setting. We consider a number of semantic conditions which give rise, among others, to intuitionistic counterparts of Lewis’s logic VC and Stalnaker’s C2. We show how to obtain a sound and complete axiomatization of each logic arising from a combination of these conditions. On the way, we remark how, in the intuitionistic setting, certain classically equivalent principles of conditional logic come apart, and how certain logical connections (...) between different principles no longer hold. (shrink)

Unfortunately, the Acknowledgements section is missing from the original publication.

The article reviews some analyses of temporal language in logical approaches to natural language semantics. It considers some asymmetries between past and future, manifested in language, which motivate the “standard view” of the non-reversibility of time and the persistence of the past. It concludes with a puzzle about the changing past which challenges the standard view.

In recent years, the study of formal semantics and formal pragmatics has grown tremendously showing that core aspects of language meaning can be explained by a few principles. These principles are grounded in the logic that is behind - and tightly intertwined with - the grammar of human language. In this book, some of the most prominent figures in linguistics, including Noam Chomsky and Barbara H. Partee, offer new insights into the nature of linguistic meaning and pave the way for (...) the further development of formal semantics and formal pragmatics. Each chapter investigates various dimensions in which the logical nature of human language manifests itself within a language and/or across languages. Phenomena like bare plurals, free choice items, scalar implicatures, intervention effects, and logical operators are investigated in depth and at times cross-linguistically and/or experimentally. This volume will be of interest to scholars working within the fields of semantics, pragmatics, language acquisition and psycholinguistics. (shrink)